University of Miami Law School

University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
Articles

Faculty and Deans

1994

The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and
Opposition (Book Review Essay)
Anthony V. Alfieri
University of Miami School of Law, aalfieri@law.miami.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Law and Society Commons, and the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility
Commons
Recommended Citation
Anthony V. Alfieri, The Ethics of Violence: Necessity, Excess, and Opposition (Book Review Essay), 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1721 (1994).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty and Deans at University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
THE ETHICS OF VIOLENCE:
NECESSITY, EXCESS, AND OPPOSITION
LAW'S VIOLENCE. Edited by Austin Sarat and Thomas P. Kearns. Ann
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992. Pp. 261. $34.50
Reviewed by Anthony V. Alfiei*
INTRODUCTION

Wanda Field' never learned to read or write. She grew up in the
deep South during the 1940s where she attended school until the fourth
grade. In the 1950s, like many Southern blacks, Field migrated North,
married, and raised a family. For thirty years, she worked in a variety of
2
unskilled, part-time jobs.
When her health began to deteriorate in the early 1980s, Field applied for Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI).3 Initially, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) denied Field's SSI claim. Field twice appealed that denial:
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. A.B., Brown

University, 1981; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1984.
I am grateful to Laura Brill, Michelle Brownlee, David Abraham, Bill Blatt, Caroline

Bradley, Michael Froomkin, Ellen Grant, Carol Greenhouse, Lisa Iglesias, Sharon Keller,
Austin Sarat, Steve Schnably, Jonathan Simon, Judge Patricia Wald, Bruce Winick, Steve

Winter, and many of my ethics students for their comments and support. I also wish to
thank Felicity McGrath, Eileen Moorhead, and the University of Miami School of Law
library staff for their research assistance.
This Essay is dedicated to Ellen.
1. The name Wanda Field is fictional; her character is not. Field's character is based

on an impoverished woman of color I represented in a disability case. My case analysis is
part of a growing interdisciplinary effort within the legal academy to construct a theoretics
of practice. Like many social scientists, participants in this effort understand that the
agents of practice-lawyers, clients, decision-makers-are bound up in a process of
observation distorted by "great ruptures between signs and what they are meant to signify."
Austin Sarat, Off to Meet the Wizard: Beyond Validity and Reliability in the Search for a
Post-empiricist Sociology of Law, 15 Law & Soc. Inquiry 155, 163 (1990).
2. For a study of historical trends in black women's participation in the workplace, see
Bette Woody, Black Women in the Workplace: Impacts of Structural Change in the
Economy 65-66 (1992).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d (1988). The SSI program provides for the payment
of benefits to individuals on the basis of age, blindness, and disability, as well as need. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1381a-1382 (defining income and resource levels). The program requires a
means test, rather than "a given amount of previous work" or "past earnings experience."
See Robert H. Haveman et al., Public Policy Toward Disabled Workers: Cross-National
Analyses of Economic Impacts 55 (1984) ("As a means-tested program, SSI has totally
removed the link between contributions and benefits."); Susan G. Mezey, No Longer
Disabled: The Federal Courts and the Politics of Social Security Disability 29 (1988) ("The
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first, at a reconsideration case review, where she proceeded pro se; and
later, at an administrative law judge (ALJ) hearing, where I served as
counsel. 4 At the ALJ hearing, I argued that HHS had misapplied its own
regulations governing the disability determination process, 5 specifically
in assessing Field's education under applicable medical-vocational guidelines.6 In particular, I complained that HHS had erred in finding Field
literate.
HHS regulations define a claimant's illiteracy as "the inability to read
or write." 7 Under this definition, HHS will "consider someone illiterate if
the person cannot read or write a simple message such as instructions or
inventory lists even though the person can sign his or her name."8 In
general, according to HHS, "an illiterate person has had little or no formal schooling."9 Had HHS properly applied its regulatory guidelines, I
contended, adjudicators would have found Field illiterate and, given her
age, work experience, and medical impairments, therefore concluded
that she was disabled.
Reversing HHS's determination at the ALJ hearing required more
creation of the SSI program has helped blur the conceptual distinction between disability
insurance and public welfare.").
4. HHS regulations establish a three-stage administrative review process. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.1407-.1482 (1993).
5. HHS regulations institute a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining
disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (1993).
6. HHS promulgated the medical-vocational guidelines as regulations in 1978. See 43
Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,466-70 (1978) (codified, as amended, at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,
app. 2 (1993)). The guidelines set out tables, or "grids," that classify exertional activities in
terms of sedentary, light, and medium work. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (1993).
The tables reflect specific matrices of vocational factors: age, education, and work
experience. They apply at step five of the sequential evaluation process after the claimant
shows that she is unable to perform "any" of her past work due to the severity of her
impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f) (1) (1993). Upon this showing, HHS "will
consider [the claimant's] residual functional capacity and [her] age, education, and past
work experience to see if [she] can do other work." Id. If the claimant "cannot" perform
such "other work" as classified under the grids, HHS "will find [her] disabled." Id.
For commentary on the medical-vocational guidelines, seeJohnJ. Capowski, Accuracy
and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social Security's MedicalVocational Guidelines-Two Birds With One Stone or Pigeon-Holing Claimants?, 42 Md.
L. Rev. 329, 383 (1983) (citing failings of the medical-vocational guidelines in making
accurate, consistent, predictable, and fair disability determinations). Cf. Kathleen
Pickering, Note, Social Security Disability Determinations: The Use and Abuse of the Grid
System, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 618 (1983) (finding that the medical-vocational guidelines
increase uniformity and efficiency of the disability determination process notwithstanding
their susceptibility to misapplication).
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court upheld HHS's use of the guidelines. See
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983) (holding HHS's reliance on medicalvocational guidelines, rather than on vocational expert testimony, to be reasonable in
appropriate cases).
7. 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b) (1) (1993).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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than a showing of Field's minimal grade level education. 10 Reversal required proof of Field's inability to read or write. I planned to produce
such evidence through direct testimony from Field" and corroborating
testimony from Field's family and friends. 12 At the hearing, upon direct
examination, Field testified that she attended school until the fourth
grade, but never learned to read or to write. Field also stated that she
never learned to do arithmetic.
Before Field could complete her direct testimony, however, the ALJ
interrupted.' 3 The ALJ pressed Field to disclose any informal education
and training acquired from her previous work, community projects, hobbies, or daily activities. 14 He asked Field to describe her past work experience, especially how she mastered duties that required instruction. He
questioned the nature of her community activities, notably the extent to
which those activities demanded reading or writing. Moreover, he questioned the scope of her daily activities and travel, particularly her ability
to shop and to travel via public transportation.
Although the ALJ's examination spanned only twenty minutes, it visibly upset Field. At times, her answers seemed contradictory. Field testified, for example, that she received no employment training but received
training on severaljobs. At other times,"her answers seemed incoherent.
Field stated, for example, that she understood but could not read bus or
subway signs. Further, she stated that she learned about news by looking
at newspapers and magazines. The apparent inconsistency of Field's flustered responses, I feared, threatened to undermine her credibility.
10. HHS regulations provide that "the numerical grade level that [a claimant]
completed in school may not represent [her] actual educational abilities." 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.964(b) (1993). The regulations note that a claimant's educational abilities in fact
"may be higher or lower." Id. Nonetheless, when "there is no other evidence to contradict
it," HHS "will use [a claimant's] numerical grade level to determine [her] educational
abilities." Id. For the purposes of this determination, HHS presumes "formal schooling at
a 6th grade level or less" to fit within a category of "marginal education." Id.
§ 416.964(b) (2) (1993). HHS defines marginal education to mean an "ability in
reasoning, arithmetic, and language skills which are needed to do simple, unskilled types
ofjobs." Id.
11. See Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding ALJ's
employment-related inference of literacy rebutted by claimant's direct testimony).
12. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1450(e) (1993) ("Witnesses may appear at a hearing."); see
also Albritton v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 640, 642-43 (5th Cir. 1989) (approving spousal
testimony regarding a claimant's illiteracy).
13. On bureaucratic patterns of ALJ intervention, see Jerry L. Mashaw et al., Social
Security Hearings and Appeals 53 (1978) (commenting on the consistent pattern of ALJ
independent evidentiary development); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice:
Managing Social Security Disability Claims 172 (1983) (describing the bureaucratic model
of administrative justice as "investigatorily active").
14. HHS regulations permit this line of inquiry. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(a), (b) (6)
(1993); see also Millner v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 243, 244-45 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding no
evidence of a claimant's formal training); cf. Vega v. Harris, 636 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir.
1981) (bemoaning absence of ALJ findings on a claimant's literacy).
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To bolster Field's credibility, I requested that the ALJ grant me an
opportunity to conduct a redirect examination. Earlier, upon entering
the hearing room, I had noticed a Metropolitan Museum of Art poster
hanging behind the ALJ's bench. Now I directed Field's attention to that
poster. I asked: "Mrs. Field, do you see the poster behind the judge's
bench?" Field answered: 'Yes." Next I asked: "Do you see the writingthe letters and the words-across the top of the poster?" Field again answered: 'Yes." Then I asked: "Please Mrs. Field, would you read the writing: the letters and the words." Field did not answer. I repeated the
question. Field kept silent. I repeated the question again. At this, Field
began to sob softly. Without pause I asked: "Mrs. Field, why won't you
read the poster?" Field continued to sob. I asked again: "Mrs. Field, why
won't you read the poster?" Field hesitated. I asked a third time: "Mrs.
Field, why won't you read the poster?" Sobbing loudly, Field responded:
"Because I can't read."
Following these words, I turned away from Field to look up at the
ALJ. During my direct examination, he had leaned forward in his chair,
often interrupting me by shaking his head or waving his hand to object or
to interpose his own questions. Now he sat back in his chair watching
Field stoically. Hunched over and downcast, Field blew her nose and
wiped her face with a tissue, muffling a cough when she tried to clear her
throat. After a few minutes of awkward silence, the ALJ renewed his examination, but his questions no longer challenged Field's illiteracy.
Field and I never spoke of the incident. We talked about the case:
the investigation of new medical evidence, the pending ALJ decision, the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. I gave her a new treating physician report to pass on to her doctor for updating. I told her to call me
when she received the ALJ decision or any other HHS correspondence. I
explained the next stage of the administrative review process and the procedures for seeking judicial review. Beyond this, we said nothing about
the hearing.
Had we tried to talk about the hearing, we would have found no
words adequate to describe, explain, and justify what had happened. To
describe Field's experience solely in terms of humiliation is to oversimplify. To explain my redirect examination only as a strategic gambit to
rehabilitate her credibility is inadequate. To justify that strategy simply
on the instrumental ground of winning is unsatisfactory. Yet, legal education and training provide us with no alternative vocabulary to describe,
explain, or justify the events of Field's hearing.
In a prior work,' 5 I fashioned the rudiments of an alternative vocabulary out of Robert Cover's writings on law's violence.16 Cover's ideas of
violence provide a vocabulary to describe and to explain, at least partially,
15. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 Yale LJ. 2107 (1991).
16. See Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word,
the Deed, and the Role, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 815 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, The Bonds of
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the sociolegal experience of people like Wanda Field: women of color
living and working in impoverished communities. Enlarging that vocabulary, I argued that poverty lawyers bring a pre-understanding of indigent
dependency to their relationship with poor clients. 1 ' Moreover, I maintained that poverty lawyers employ methods of interpretive violencemarginalization, subordination, and discipline-that effectively
reproduce dependency among their clients. 18
In response to my argument, Lucie White added that "the violent
interpretive practices of poverty advocates are themselves embedded in
worlds where other violent practices ...pervade people's lives." 19 White
observed that violence in poor communities is "so common" that it is
"often invisible" to the "outside world." 20 The violence, she explained,
takes many forms: employment firings, housing evictions, welfare terminations. 21 Frequently, White pointed out, the violence is linked to racial
animus.2 2 This link enables state and private agents of violence to reinflict and to . suppress "the horror of past atrocities" in poor
2
communities. 3
Wanda Field's case is about the horror and invisibility of racial violence manifested in educational inequality, school segregation, and adult
illiteracy. To understand how I both reinflicted and suppressed racial
violence in representing Field requires an alternative vocabulary that describes, explains, and justifies the intersection of law, lawyers, legal institutions, and violence. The task of locating this intersection urges us to revisit Cover's work and to reread his lexicon of violence.
In this Essay, I renew my reading of Cover's writings under the guidance of Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns's recent collection of essays
entitled Law's Violence. The essays expand the foundation for an alternative vocabulary describing, explaining, and justifying law's violence. Even
as it expands, however, the foundation stands lacking. Nowhere in the
growing vocabulary of violence is there reference to lawyers asjurispathic
agents or to lawyers' interpretive practices as discrete forms of normative
violence. Without an account of lawyers as agents of interpretive violence, we overlook the normative, rather than the physical or psychological, pain experienced by the objects of law: plaintiffs, defendants, victims-in short, clients. It is plain error to overlook the pain experienced
by clients when we-as lawyers-act to erase their identities, to silence
Constitutional Interpretation]; Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale LJ. 1601
(1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence and the Word].
17.
18.
19.
(1992).
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Alfieri, supra note 15, at 2123-25.
See id. at 2125-30.
Lucie E. White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 Hastings LJ. 853, 856
Id. at 857.
See id.
See id.
See id. (footnote omitted).
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their narratives, and to suppress their histories during advocacy. The
purpose of this Essay is to cure that error.
The Essay is divided into four parts. Part I examines the jurisprudence of violence conceived by Cover and extended by Sarat and Kearns.
Employing Wanda Field's hearing as a case study, I enlarge that jurisprudence to address lawyers' interpretive violence and clients' normative
pain. Part II assesses the argument from necessity offered to explain and
to justify lawyers' acts of interpretive violence. Citing Field's case, I note
the forces of law and institutional logic that urge this necessitarian defense. Part III analyzes the limits of the necessitarian justification for lawyers' violence. Calling again on Field's case, I distinguish between descriptive and performative speech acts in legal advocacy in order to
establish a boundary line of excess violence. Part IV considers an alternative strategy of opposing and thereby curbing lawyers' necessitarian justification. Pointing to the intersection of normative and narrative violence
in Field's case, I propose reopening lawyers' meaning-making practices of
reading and speaking to test the limits of the speakable in advocacy. The
strategy of reopening, testing, and mapping the limits of the speakable
allows client identity, narrative, and history to emerge in the lawyering
process.
I. VIOLENCE

Curing analytic, normative, and strategic errors in the lawyering process revives interest in Cover's jurisprudence of violence, particularly his
concept ofjurispathic practice. This core concept warrants special heed
because it expands to encompass lawyers' acts of knowing, interpreting,
and speaking, even when the acts are implicit and private. Situated at the
intersection of law and violence, Field's case demonstrates how such acts
inflict normative pain on a client by erasing her identity, silencing her
narratives, and suppressing her history.
In Law's Violence, Sarat and Kearns study the jurisprudential turmoil
surrounding the intersection of law and violence. 24 Sarat and Kearns
find the linkages between law and violence at once troubling and intriguing.25 They especially puzzle over the ways that law denies or conceals
26
the infliction of violence by legal agents upon legal subjects.
24. Sarat and Kearns's investigation is part of an ongoing project to build a
jurisprudence of violence. See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Keams, A Journey Through
Forgetting: Toward ajurisprudence of Violence, in The Fate of Law 209-73 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991); Austin Sarat, Robert Cover on Law and Violence, in
Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of Robert Cover 255-76 (Martha Minow et
al. eds., 1992).

25. See Sarat & Kearns, supra note 24, at 211 ("[Tlhe general link between law and
violence and the ways that law manages to work its lethal will, to impose pain and death
while remaining aloof and unstained by the deeds themselves, is still an unexplored and
hardly noticed mystery in the life of the law.").
26. See id. at 209.
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Sarat and Kearns define law's agents broadly to include police officers, judges, and prison guards. They assert that "[t] he association of law
and violence is visible in the discrete acts of law's agents-the gun fired
by the police, the sentence pronounced by the judge, the execution carried out behind prison walls" (pp. 1, 6). Both the physical and interpretive acts of these agents help shape the law's "violent constitution" (p. 3).
To Sarat and Kearns, violence constitutes law by enacting, affirming,
and enforcing the logic of a legal order. Backed by violence, that logic
establishes the superiority of a particular order. In law, as in lawyering,
superiority is demonstrated not by "ferocious displays of force," but by
"subjugating, colonizing, 'civilizing' acts of violence" (p. 3). Logic deems
such acts, like Field's direct and redirect examinations, rational.
The rationality of violence turns on the purposes and norms of a
legal order. Violence that advances the purposes and ratifies the norms
of a regime is presumptively rational and legitimate. Capital punishment,
however reprehensible, meets this presumption. Conversely, violence
that contradicts the purposes or breaches the norms of a regime is irrational and illegitimate. Lynching exemplifies such a transgression. Even
without evidence of contradiction or breach, Sarat and Kearns fear that
violence may overwhelm the rationality of law (p. 2) and thereby render
legitimacy impossible.
Fear of law's delegitimizing violence is absent from important
strands of contemporary jurisprudence. 2 7 Sarat and Kearns point to this
absence in the humanist's emphasis on the "meaning-making," rather
than the "coercive," character of law (p. 7). They note a similar absence
in the social scientist's "disaggregation" of violence into isolated acts unfastened to theory (p. 8).28
Weaknesses in the jurisprudence of the humanities and social sciences prompt Sarat and Kearns to search critical theory for an account of
violence that recognizes the interplay of coercion in law, legal relations,
and legal institutions. Yet critical accounts that incorporate epistemological, interpretive, and linguistic practices in explicating lawyers' acts of violence apparently err in labelling certain coercive, pain-imposing events

27. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1233, 1240-41 (1992) (noting
the violent "effacement" of a client's identity and social world in the jurisprudence of the
law and humanities movement).
28. The disjunction between theory and practice fosters the oversimplification of
sociolegal phenomena. See Austin Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law:
On the Unfortunate Persistence of a Research Tradition, 9 Legal Stud. F. 23, 30 (1985)
(warning of "overly simplified conception[s] of power"); see also Austin Sarat, Donald
Black Discovers Legal Realism: From Pure Science to Policy Science in the Sociology of
Law, 14 Law & Soc. Inquiry 765, 784 (1989) (criticizing Black's "scientific sociology of
law"); Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 Law & Pol'y 97, 122
(1988) (mentioning the normal characterization of legal empirical sociology in the
"language of science").
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violent.2 9 For Sarat and Kearns, an expansion of usage and a diffusion of
meaning threaten to dilute the idea of violence, "to undo the subject itself" (p. 10).30 To stabilize the meaning of violence, they attempt to construct a jurisprudence of violence that provides a critique of the law's
coercive force deployed primarily by state institutional agents, namely
31
judges.
In this way, Sarat and Kearns's jurisprudence of violence builds on
the account developed by Cover.3 2 Cover conceives of law's violence33in
both normative and physical terms. Normative violence isjurispathic: it
destroys the values of a community. For Cover, community values constitute a nomos.3 4 When state authority and community values conflict over
the application of law, judges serve asjurispathic interpreters3 5 decreeing
"imperial" narratives3 6 that kill alternative community values. 3 7 Some29. See, e.g., Alfieri, supra note 15 (applying the concept of interpretive violence to
the lawyer-client relation in the context of poverty law). Compare Austin Sarat, Speaking
of Death: Narratives of Violence in Capital Trials, 27 Law & Soc'y Rev. 19, 23 (1993)
(exploring "the ways lawyers use linguistic structures to represent different kinds of
violence" in capital trials).
30. Sarat and Kearns contend that "[i]f everything is violent, then the word and the
idea lose their meaning and their normative and critical bite" (p. 10).
31. Sarat and Keams'sjurisprudential construction assembles three themes. The first
gauges the design of institutional procedures authorizing and deploying the force of
violence. See, e.g., Elaine Scarry, The Declaration of War Constitutional and
Unconstitutional Violence (p. 23); Patricia M. Wald, Violence Under the Law: A Judge's
Perspective (p. 77). The second traces the cultural and historical meaning of violence
across cultures and over time. See, e.g., CarolJ. Greenhouse, Reading Violence (p. 105);
Douglas Hay, Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence (p. 141). The third measures the
impact of violence on law and society. See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, Private Violence as
Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration and Example (p. 175); Sarat and Kearns, Making
Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory (p. 211).
32. See Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16; Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative]; Cover, Violence and the Word, supra
note 16.
33. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 32, at 40-44. See also Martha Minow,
Introduction: Robert Cover and Law, Judging, and Violence, in Narrative, Violence, and
the Law, supra note 24, at 1, 1-2 ("[Cover] coined the termjurispathicto refer to the power
and practice of a government that rules by displacing, suppressing, or exterminating values
that run counter to its own.").
34. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 32, at 9. Cover explains: "A nomos, as
a world of law, entails the application of human will to an extant state of affairs as well as
toward our visions of alternative futures. A nomos is a present world constituted by a system
of tension between reality and vision." Id.
35. See Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16, at 819.
36. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 32, at 13.
Normative meaning is implanted in narrative. When the state decrees law, it imposes
an incontestable narrative order on a social world composed of diverse communities and
contested narratives. See Michael Ryan, Meaning and Alternity, in Narrative, Violence,
and the Law, supra note 24, at 267, 274.
37. See Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 32, at 53, 60. Significantly, Cover
approves the killing of nomoi when the norms of such communities involve political
exclusion and disenfranchisement on the basis of race, notwithstanding his anarchistic
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times that interpretive killing is "writ in blood,"38 as in the case of capital
punishment.
Cover's allusion to blood confirms the physical character of violence.3 9 To Cover, legal interpretation is "inextricably bound up with the
real threat or practice of violent deeds.. ."40 Even routine, practical acts
of interpretation take place on "a field of pain and death."4 ' When serving as the trier of fact in criminal proceedings, for example, ajudge must
evaluate the evidentiary record, make findings of guilt or innocence, and
pronounce sentence. These interpretive acts carry coercive force, inflicting the pain of imprisonment and even death.
Sarat and Kearns seek to understand the necessity of law's reliance
on force, the tendency of law's agents to impose excess force, and the
possibility of opposing such force (pp. 20-21). Entirely absent from Sarat
and Kearns's catalogue of state agents, however, is the role of lawyers in
the context of advocacy. Lawyers too act as law's jurispathic agents. Like
judges, police officers, and prison guards, they apply epistemological, interpretive, and linguistic practices to kill alternative normative meanings
embraced by individuals and communities. Unlike state agents, 42 those
killing practices stem from a benevolent impulse to intervene on behalf
of a client's best interests, rather than from a homicidal impulse to impress the pain of imprisonment or the sentence of death.
distrust of state authority. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 Yale LJ. 1287, 1301-02 (1982) [hereinafter Cover, Origins of
judicial Activism]. See generally Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the
Judicial Process (1975) [hereinafter Cover, Justice Accused]. Cover reasons:
Despite the growth of national bureaucratic and administrative penetration,
I would suggest that the judiciary's special, active role in protecting minorities
may well have resulted in a less intrusive and pervasive centralized administration
than would have been the case with other, alternative courses to integration. Put
differently, given the objective of ending Apartheid, the activist federal judiciary
as spearhead was the mode of action least likely to destroy the ultimate values
served by fragmentation of political power and local political control over
administration. Government by injunction may often appear highhanded,
undemocratic, even tyrannical; but, in fairness, one must always ask compared to
what.
Cover, Origins of Judicial Activism, supra, at 1313-14 (footnote omitted).
Cover limits his concession to centralized authority by supporting the "relatively
unrestrained redundancy" of concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction, citing the
advantages and disadvantages of interest, ideology, innovation, and "polycentric norm
articulation." Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 639, 658-80, 682 (1981).
38. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 32, at 46.
39. See Mark Tushnet, Reflections on Capital Punishment: One Side of an
Uncompleted Discussion, 7J.L. & Religion 21, 21 (1989) (noting Cover's recognition of
law as an instrument of physical violence).
40. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16, at 816. To
Cover, "[i]nterpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion." Cover, Nomos and
Narrative, supra note 32, at 40.
41. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 16, at 1601, 1607, 1610.
42. Prosecutors stand within the definition of state agents.

1730

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:1721

Sarat and Keams implicitly distinguish between pain-imposing and
death-dealing acts of violence. But, they fail to distinguish between the
normative and physical qualities of pain experienced by the objects of
law: plaintiffs, defendants, and victims. By normative pain, I mean the
pain experienced by parties and nonparties during the lawyering process
when their identities are erased, their narratives are silenced, and their
histories are suppressed. Sarat and Kearns privilege physical over normative forms of pain, creating a hierarchy of pain-imposing violence. This
dichotomy may be defensible, but Sarat and Kearns offer no defense.
They seem in fact to dismiss the subject of normative pain and to ignore
the jurispathic practices of lawyers that inflict such pain.
Cover's jurisprudence of violence, albeit unfinished, encourages recognition of normative pain as a distinctive form of violence engendered
by lawyers' jurispathic practices of knowing, interpreting, and speaking.
To be sure, lawyers do not act alone; they act in concert with laws and
institutional decision-makers. Yet, in poor communities, their actions are
43
especially glaring.
Although Cover's work shows a deep commitment to the poor,4 4 his
account of violence omits sustained treatment of poor people as objects
of violent acts and of lawyers as agents responsible for such acts. 45 His
43. In his essay, Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence, Douglas Hay argues that
socioeconomic status dictates the experience of violence. It is the poor, he observes, who
frequently suffer the "coercive impact" of the law and, hence, represent the "most direct
victims of its violence" (p. 169).
44. Cover's early writings clearly evince a commitment to the poor. See generally
Robert M. Cover, Establishing Federal Jurisdiction In Actions Brought to Vindicate
Statutory (Federal) Rights When No Violations of Constitutional Rights Are Alleged-Part
I, 2 Clearinghouse Rev. 5 (Feb.-Mar. 1969); Robert M. Cover, Establishing Federal
Jurisdiction In Actions Brought to Vindicate Statutory (Federal) Rights When No
Violations of Constitutional Rights Are Alleged-Part II, 3 Clearinghouse Rev. 7 (May
1969); Robert M. Cover, Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 84 (1967).
His later writings echo that commitment. See Robert M. Cover et al., Procedure
37-105 (1988) [hereinafter Cover, Procedure] (reviewing the welfare litigation history of
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)); Robert M. Cover, Federalism and Administrative
Structure, 92 Yale LJ. 1342, 1343 (1983) (mentioning "local elite domination over
beneficiary groups" under federal-state cooperative programs); Robert M. Cover, Social
Security and Constitutional Entitlement, in Social Security: Beyond the Rhetoric of Crisis
69-87 (Theodore R. Marmor &Jerry L. Mashaw eds. 1988) (proposing the assignment of a
"modest" constitutional status to Social Security entitlement programs).
Friends and commentators also mention Cover's longstanding commitment. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 Yale L.J. 945, 945-46, 951-53, 966-67 (1989)
(reviewing Cover, Procedure, supra) (noting the dignitary and empowerment interests of
the socially disadvantaged and economically marginalized highlighted in Cover's
pedagogy); Stephen Wizner, Tributes to Robert M. Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1707, 1707-08
(1987) (describing Cover's work at the Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law).
45. Unlike other readers of Cover's work, I make no attempt to locate Cover within an
express philosophical or theological tradition. Compare Richard K. Sherwin, Law,
Violence, and Illiberal Belief, 78 Geo. LJ. 1785, 1822 (1990) (lauding Cover's commitment
to the "institutionalization of discursive diversity" within the liberal democratic state) and
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attention centers instead on the more public agents of violence: judges.
Like judges, lawyers' routine labor entails practical acts of interpretation.
In Field's case, for example, the routine labor of lawyer direct and
redirect examination involved acts of regulatory and doctrinal interpretation concerning the meaning of disability and literacy.4 6 Field lacked the
requisite instruction, skills, and training to satisfy HHS's measure of literacy. When combined with evidence of her medical impairments, age,
and work experience, Field's minimal education directed a finding of disability. To ensure that finding, I interpreted and therefore portrayed
Field as a disabled woman of color victimized by illiteracy.
To my surprise, Field resisted this interpretation. Field's expressed
identity drew from her experience of functional literacy, not from a regulatory definition of formal education and employment skills. Her narratives of employment training, public transportation, and semiotic reading
described this experience. Her history of surviving racial inequality and
school segregation, and rearing a family affirmed that experience. Interpreting Field's identity, narratives, and history in this light risked enlarging the meaning of literacy to stress functional competence and, hence,
threatened to provide the ALJ with an easy opportunity to deny her benefits. Field's own ambiguous statements magnified this risk, causing me to
disrupt her prior scripted testimony and to suppress her identity, narratives, and history of functional competence in determining the meaning
of literacy.
Cover confirms that the interpretive process endows law's agents
with the power, exerted through words and deeds, to determine the
meaning of law,47 in this case the meaning of disability-related literacy.
Bryan Schwartz, Individuals and Community, 7 J.L. & Religion 131, 147-48 (1989)
(portraying Cover as sympathetic to philosophical liberalism) with Milner S. Ball, Law and
Prophets, Bridges andJudges, 7J.L. & Religion 1 (1989) (studying biblical texts for lessons
of prophecy, law, andjudging recited in Cover's work) and Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of
the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal
Theory, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 819-20 (1993) (connecting Cover's vision of law to the
Jewish legal tradition).
46. Legal interpretation distorts meaning. Hay attributes this distorting influence in
part to law's codification of "socially destructive force" in doctrinal and statutory forms (pp.
143-44). The force may be market driven. Disability law, for example, reduces Field to
the status of a labor commodity, applying vocational guidelines and work classification
tables to evaluate her market worth.
47. See Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16, at 833; see
also Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 16, at 1618. Cover observes:
Each kind of interpreter speaks from a distinct institutional location. Each has a
differing perspective on factual and moral implications of any given
understanding of the Constitution. The understanding of each will vary as roles
and moral commitments vary. But considerations of word, deed, and role will
always be present in some degree. The relationships among these three
considerations are created by the practical, violent context of the practice of legal
interpretation, and therefore constitute the most significant aspect of the legal
interpretive process.
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Lawyer-determined meaning does violence to client identity, narrative,
and history. Clients experience this violence as normative pain. My direct and redirect examinations of Field inflicted such pain by highlighting her disabling impairments and illiteracy. Because racial inequality
and segregation are irrelevant to disability law, I omitted historical narratives of race from the examinations. Accordingly, I did not ask Field why
she stopped going to school or how segregation affected the quality of
her education. Had I asked, I might have learned that Field dropped out
of school to work with her father, a tenant farmer. Additionally, I might
have discovered that Field's teachers had little training, that her books
were antiquated, that her schoolhouse lacked plumbing, heat, and electricity, and that her school district lacked the buses needed to transport
children daily to and from school. The absence of these historical
narratives suppressed the racial violence-reconstruction, 48 lynching, 49
inequality,5 0 and segregation 51-underlying Field's illiteracy.5 2
48. On Reconstruction era racial violence against schools, see George C.Rable, But
There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction 97-98
(1984).
49. For sociolegal studies of lynching, see Jacquelyn D. Hall, Revolt Against Chivalry:
Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign Against Lynching 129-57 (1993)
(describing lynching as a ritualistic instrument of racial discipline and repression); Robert
L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 (1980) (analyzing
NAACP's local and national campaign against lynching waged in executive, legislative,
judicial, and popular forums); Amii L. Barnard, The Application of Critical Race Feminism
to the Anti-Lynching Movement: Black Women's Fight Against Race and Gender Ideology,
1892-1920, 3 UCLA Women's L.J.. 1, 4 (1993) (citing lynching and rape as
"interdependent links" in the Southern system of racial inequality, sexual exploitation, and
subjugation); Susan Olzak, The Political Context of Competition: Lynching and Urban
Racial Violence, 1882-1914, 69 Soc. Forces 395, 399-402 (1990) (pointing to political and
economic competition as causal mechanisms of mobilizing urban violence and lynchings
against blacks in the South).
50. On educational inequality, see James D. Anderson, The Education of Blacks in the
South, 1860-1935 122 (1988) (discussing historical caste system of "second-class" black
education in postbellum South); Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of the New South: Life
After Reconstruction 420 (1992) (noting that while Southern "state legislatures spent
money for whites on longer school years, on lower student-teacher ratios, and on higher
salaries for teachers, those same legislatures allowed salaries for black teachers to decay
and class sizes to grow larger"); William Bagwell, School Desegregation in the Carolinas
41-43 (1972) (documenting race-based spending discrepancy in North and South
Carolina public schools); Robert Coles, Children of Crisis 160, 169-70 (1967) (citing the
"second-rate" quality of "Negro education"); David R. Goldfield, Black, White, and
Southern 55 (1990) (finding deficient classrooms, buildings, and equipment in black
school districts); Albert B. Hart, The Southern South 308-22 (1910) (describing the
impoverished conditions of "Negro education" in the South); Edward E. Redcay, County
Training Schools and Public Secondary Education for Negroes in the South 23 (1935)
(noting race-based differences in Southern secondary school facilities); Carter G.
Woodson, A Century of Negro Migration 155 (1918) (reviewing diminishing public school
appropriations for Southern "Negroes"); Michael Aiken & N.J. Demerath III, Tokenism in
the Delta: Two Mississippi Cases, in Our Children's Burden: Studies of Desegregation in
Nine American Cities 41, 43-107 (Raymond W. Mack ed., 1968) (depicting separate and
unequal educational conditions in Mississippi and Georgia); Ruth P. Simms, The Savannah
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My examinations also suppressed Field's narratives of functional literacy. In his essay, "Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence," Douglas Hay
contends that the privileging of one text, in this case illiteracy, requires
"the partial or entire silencing of others" (p. 169), here functional literacy. When a text is privileged, that is when "those with the power to make
texts can disseminate one version of a case," 5 3 law's violence becomes
imperceptible (p. 169). Lawyers, Hay asserts, find virtue in law's ability to
silence texts.
Silencing or withholding testimony of Field's functional literacy was
an implicit act of violence. In her essay, "Violence Under the Law: A
Judge's Perspective," Judge Patricia Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit mentions the danger of failing to ac54
knowledge law's implicit violence (p. 103). In the context of the family,

Story: Education and Desegregation, in Our Children's Burden, supra, 109, 111-40

(portraying similar conditions in Georgia); Mark V. Tushnet, Organizing Civil Rights
Litigation: The NAACP's Experience, in Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the South

171, 176 (David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984) (mentioning "grossly
unequal" per capita expenditures in black and white schools).
51. On segregated education, see Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American
Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 153 (1993) (discussing the
adverse impact of segregation on educational environments);JudyJ. Mohraz, The Separate
Problem: Case Studies of Black Education in the North, 1900-1930, at xiv (1979)
(observing that "segregation produced inferior education for black children because of
inadequate facilities and frequently diluted academic programs"); Kenneth B. Clark,
Segregation and Educational Quality, in The Black American and Education 216 (Earle H.
West ed., 1972) (commenting on the "consistently inferior" education provided to black
children in segregated schools); cf.John B. Martin, The Deep South Says "Never" 148-49
(1958) (remarking upon "low Negro achievement" in desegregated schools).
52. On race, poverty, and illiteracy, see Carman St. John Hunter & David Harman,
Adult Illiteracy in the United States 43 (1979) (citing statistical interrelationships in
illiteracy among the variables of poverty, education, and racial or ethnic origin); National
Center for Education Statistics, Adult Literacy in America 35 (1993) (attributing literacy
rate disparities between white and black adults to variations in educational quality and
differences in socioeconomic status); National Center for Education Statistics, NAEP 1992
Reading Report Card for the Nation and the States 121-22 (1993) (finding that
advantaged urban students showed higher average reading proficiency than students
attending schools in communities classified as "extreme rural" or "disadvantaged urban");
Lawrence C. Stedman & Carl F. Kaestle, Literacy and Reading Performance in the United
States from 1880 to the Present, in Literacy in the Unitea States: Readers and Reading
since 1880, at 75, 123 (Carl F. Kaestle et al. eds., 1991) (observing that "women, blacks,
other minorities, the poor, southerners, and the foreign born have been less literate on
average than their male, white, middle-class, northern, native-born counterparts").
53. See also Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce
Lawyer's Office, 20 Law & Soc'y Rev. 93, 117 (1986) ("Lawyers ...legitimate some parts of
human experience and deny the relevance of others .... .").
54. Judge Wald has voiced skepticism about federal court "self-imposed abstention"
from the private sphere of the family. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Unsolicited Advice to
My Women Friends in Eastern Europe, 46 SMU L. Rev. 557, 571-72 (1992) ("The lesson
our history teaches is that women and their families are still presumed not to be significant
enough 'national interests' of the United States to merit federal consideration except
through the side entrance and on an ad hoc basis.").
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for example, Judge Wald argues that federal courts have withheld their
power to hear the testimony of vulnerable women and children (p.
103). 55 Withholding of this kind suppresses evidence of both public and
private violence.
Although demeaning, the violence of disrupting Field's testimony to
underscore the painful inferiority and stigma 5 6 of illiteracy served the instrumental purpose of defeating the ALJ's attempt to impeach her credibility.5 7 Both lawyers and decision-makers commit normative violence for
instrumental or remedial gain. Lawyers classify violence as a transaction
cost 5 8 Erasing client identity, silencing client narrative, or suppressing
client history is simply the price of lawyer benevolence. Decision-makers
endorse remedial acts of violence but concede balancing the risk of Wiolence against competing legal values (pp. 78, 103). 59 To fulfill the responsibility of balancing, Judge Wald urges judicial decision-makers to
engage in "very particularized fact finding and prediction making" (p.
99). 6 0 When sufficient evidence of "anticipated violence" (p. 100) is adOn judicial competence in the family law context, see Ralph Cavanagh & Austin Sarat,
Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence ofJudicial Competence, 14
Law & Soc'y Rev. 371, 394-403 (1980) (studying the role of courts in "related-party" cases).
55. Judge Wald has previously mentioned such vulnerability. See Patricia M. Wald,
Government Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 263 (1990)
("The neediest of our citizens are most conspicuously dependent on government largesse
for the satisfaction of their most basic needs.").
56. On race-based inferiority and stigma, see Tristan L. Duncan, Narrative
Jurisprudence: The Remystification of the Law, 7 J.L. & Religion 105, 107 (1989)
("Brown's pain [in Brown v. Board of Education, 374 U.S. 483 (1954)] was stigmatization,
second class inferiority, racial inequality."); Henry L. Gates, Jr., Writing "Race" and the
Difference It Makes, in "Race," Writing, and Difference 1, 6 (Henry L. Gates, Jr. ed., 1986)
("[L]iteracy... is the emblem that links racial alienation with economic alienation.").
57. There is some evidence that Cover might approve of my manipulation of Field's
participatory rights to achieve valid substantive ends. See Robert M. Cover, ForJames Win.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 Yale LJ. 718, 731 (1975)
("Purposeful manipulation of the scope of [litigant] participation to achieve substantive
ends is permissible and appropriate.").
58. In employment discrimination cases, for example, lawyers regard the plaintiffs
burden of producing evidence of psychological harm as merely a cost of transacting civil
rights advocacy. But see Harris v. Forklift Sys., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (holding that judicial
finding of a discriminatorily abusive work environment does not require evidence of
concrete psychological harm or injury under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
59. Judge Wald has approved balancing jurisprudence before. See Patricia M. Wald,
Constitutional Conundrums, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 727, 731 (1990) ("Our constitutional law
is embedded in the notion of defining and balancing strongly felt interests in our societyit is not likely to change soon; many of us would regret such a change."). Her approval
arises in the context of the "grander debate over judicial discretion," namely, "whether to
acknowledge that it exists, how tojustify it, how to use it, and how to restrain it." Patricia
M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Haroard
Law Rview and Other Great Books, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 895 (1987).
60. Judge Wald has repeatedly addressed the fact-finding process in judicial decisionmaking. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and Ends: Court of Appeals
Review of Administrative LawJudges' Findings and Opinions, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 661, 665
(1989) (remarking that appellate judges reviewing administrative law judge agency
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duced, she explains, judges must decide whether that quantum of violence is "tolerable" (pp. 99-100) given the weight of countervailing
61
values.
Erasing Field's identity of functional competence, silencing her narratives of functional literacy, and suppressing her history of suffering racial inequality and segregation constituted private acts of violence as well.
In his essay, "Private Violence as Moral Action: The Law as Inspiration
and Example," Robert Weisberg denotes private violence as a form of
violence "perpetrated by private individuals against each other" (p.
175).62 He analyzes how such violence comes to signify "an act of lawmaking or law enforcement" and to serve as the "operative law" in a specific cultural context (p. 175).63

The motive or inspiration for private acts of violence may be found
in the acts of lawmaking and law enforcement embedded in legal advocacy. In Field's case, I attempted an act of lawmaking when I tried to
establish the condition of illiteracy as practically disabling. Similarly, I
attempted an act of law enforcement when I worked to ratify Field's illiteracy-based SSI claim of entitlement. In this respect, private violence
comes to serve both moralistic and remedial ends (p. 178).64
findings "have limited expertise and resources to absorb, synthesize, and accommodate all
of the facts and evidence presented by parties throughout the adversarial process");
Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 135, 149 (1982) (citing "the need of appellate judges for more
information and expertise" in handling complex technical cases).
61. Judge Wald's defense of countervailing values, such as free speech and assembly,
is well known. See Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and
Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 21
(1987) (asserting that thejudiciary's "paramount function under the separation of powers
doctrine [is] to enforce the rights of individuals against the government"); cf. Patricia M.
Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 753, 761 (1988) (noting
that "critical areas exist in which first amendment rights-to speak out, to associate, to
know, to obtain judicial redress for violation of one's constitutional rights-may be
curtailed under the rubric of national security"); Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of
Information Act: A Short Case Study in the Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic
Values, 33 Emory LJ. 649, 681-82 (1984) (stating that "tension between claims of national
security and open government is not an unhealthy condition-at least not until we have
more reliable evidence that it is producing critical harm").
62. Weisberg cites the role of the law, and by extension, the state in "punishing,
permitting, accommodating, encouraging, or inspiring the very private violence it purports
to suppress or replace" (p. 176).
63. Weisberg remarks that nonstate agents "often subjectively, and even sometimes
objectively, engag[e] in acts of lawmaking or law enforcement disturbingly analogous to
public legal authority" (p. 178). See also Tushnet, supra note 39, at 25 (citing "an
unavoidable connection between the practice of social violence through law, with which
Cover was primarily concerned, and the practice of individual violence").
64. Weisberg identifies several forms of private violence I will call regime-subverting,
regime-preserving, and regime-destroying. Regime-subverting violence arises from the
perceived illegitimacy of state law. It is a form of private remedial action aimed at
illegitimate laws (p. 182). Weisberg notes the long "tradition of self-help violence
associated with attacks on legal regimes that lack legitimacy" (p. 183). This tradition
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Under the analogy of private violence, Weisberg explains, people do
not so much violate the law as they uphold it (pp. 178-79). To explicate
this anomaly, Weisberg describes private violence as "a dominant and legitimate mode of law enforcement" (p. 179). Its legitimacy rests on its
remedial character, factual undergirding, and moral substance (p.
180).65 For Weisberg, the private violence of lawmaking and law enforcement constitutes a purposive act of meaning-making tied to the construction and enforcement of an imagined moral order.
Field inhabited a law- and lawyer-imagined moral order without identity, narrative, or history. My efforts to make and to enforce the disability
law of literacy at Field's ALJ hearing limited her opportunity to assert her
racial identity or history with dignity. 66 Effacing clients' identities, narra-

tives, and histories permits lawyers to construct a moral order imbued
with demeaning values and false stories. That order distorts the legal imagination, transforming the meaning of advocacy from an act of hope
67
into an act of pain. Lawyers' necessitarian reasoning justifies that pain.
employs criminal conduct as a law-establishing "instrument" (pp. 184-85). In a sense, such
conduct is an attempt to overturn the "political and economic prejudice" Weisberg finds
"at the heart of the substantive criminal laws." Robert Weisberg, Foreword: Criminal
Procedure Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 832,
853 (1985).
Regime-preserving violence springs from individual and community action against a
named "outsider" (p. 185). See also Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the
Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 521, 554 (1992) [hereinafter Weisberg,
Small World] ("Nothing so inspires group violence against outsiders or perceived
transgressors as the sense that the group is carrying out a lawmaking or law-preserving
mission."). It is a private remedy against the perceived threat to a community's cultural
"integrity" (p. 185). Collective criminal conduct induces a sense of community cohesion
and meaning. Weisberg mentions that incidents of community misrule are oftentimes
marked by carnival or ritual violence (p. 185). In American history, slavery and lynching
are especially malevolent examples of such violence. See Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., Violence
and Culture in the Antebellum South 137-60 (1979) (describing the violence, conflict,
and arbitrary rule of slaveholder plantation authority).
Regime-destroying violence is a "subtler" category of private violence (p. 185). In this
category, violence feels like law (p. 185), but the element of law and community are
" 'purely' psychological and analogic" (p. 185). In regime-destroying violence, Weisberg
contends, "there is no question of any legal recognition of excuse orjustification" (p. 185).
For Weisberg, the self-help killer belongs to this category. This modal killer considers
violence a form of moral revenge and law enforcement.
On the criminal as a postmodern moralist, see Weisberg, Small World, supra at 550.
65. Weisberg observes that "[m]uch violence is committed by people thoroughly
persuaded that they are enforcing legitimate legal or moral norms" (p. 182).
66. Limiting a client's opportunity to be heard may induce client self-blame. See
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in
Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 737, 764 (1988) (discussing the role of
spousal fault and blame in divorce cases).
67. Lawyers often articulate this necessitarian logic in seemingly intuitive terms. See
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 Yale L.J. 1663, 1671 (1989) ("Lawyers often talk about what can
or cannot be done or what is or is not likely to happen without explicitly noting that their
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II. NECEssrry
Lawyers rationalize their pain-imposing acts of interpretive violence
on the basis of necessity. Although arguments that posit violence as a
necessary part of advocacy are intelligible and justifiable, 8 they are overbroad. Field's case illustrates the problem of overbreadth in necessitarian
reasoning. Here, the argument from necessity arises out of the constraints of disability law and legal relations. Field's identity, narratives,
and history, however, do not fit the formal discourse of disability law. 69
Likewise, her assertions of functional competence do not meet the conditions of dependency that shape lawyer-client relations. Overriding these
conflicts in reliance upon an unchecked necessitarian logic legitimizes
distorted laws and domesticates hierarchical legal relations.
Neither Field nor I spoke about the distorted content of disability
law or the hierarchical quality of our relationship. Advocacy traditions
celebrate lawyers' willingness to come to the "valiant" defense of their
clients, 70 in Field's case the defense of a claimed entitlement to SSI benefits, not a defense of law or legal relations. Erecting a defense through
law and legal institutions pushes lawyers to think and to talk about their
clients in ways that erase identity, silence narrative, and suppress history.
Disability law, for example, compelled me to fit Field's identity into the
regulatory categories of medical impairment, age, work experience, and
illiteracy. Narratives that helped institutional decision-makers fit Field
into these categories, commonly the narratives of treating physicians and
employers, were relevant. Narratives that did not help tailor this fit were
irrelevant. To deal with the necessities of law and institutional decisionmaking, lawyers construct partial, and sometimes false, client identities
and histories. This construction, forged of necessity,
inflicts pain-in
7
Field's case the pain of humiliation and silence. '
views are shaped by statutes or court decisions, although the trained ear would recognize
that their formulations are clearly rooted in an understanding of rules.").
68. Arguments from necessity may be cast positively or negatively. The positive claim,
at bar in Field's case, justifies lawyer conduct on the ground of achieving material benefit
for a client. The negative claim rationalizes lawyer behavior on the basis of protecting a
client from material deprivation.
69. The clash between Field's identity and disability law necessitated what Carol
Greenhouse aptly calls Field's "performance of credibility." Letter from CarolJ. Greenhouse
to Anthony V. Alfieri (Apr. 5, 1994) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
70. On the self-celebration of lawyer valor, see Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 67, at
1682 ("[L]aw talk [in the divorce context] suggests distance between lawyer and legal order,
with the former portrayed as struggling valiantly within the confines of a process that seems
neither equitable norjust." (footnote omitted)).
Given the unstable meaning of virtue, it is perhaps unfair to cast the lawyer as villain.
Cf. Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of
the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 13-21 (1986) (demonstrating the conceptual
instability of mercantile images of virtue and villany).
71. For a discussion of the doctrinal and institutional framework of necessitarian logic
in disability law, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 Hastings
L.J. 769 (1992).
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The necessity of lawyer-imposed violence also stems from the requirements of disability fights advocacy and interpretation. In Field's
case, the effort to achieve a "commonality of interpretation" with respect
to the meaning of disability rights was constrained by the "divergent experiences" of the institutional agents who constitute such meaning: 72 lawyers, policy-makers, andjudges. Common meaning was further narrowed
by the "abstract and formal" nature of fights discourse. 73 Thus confined,
prevailing disability rights discourse of literacy overlooks the dignity of
functional literacy and the history of race-based educational inequality
and segregation. 74 Lawyers accustomed to constructing demeaning roles
for their clients and distant, exalted roles for themselves fail to detect this
oversight.75 That failure may be attributed to lawyers' belief that certain
72. See Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 16, at 1609. Cover remarks: "[A]s
long as legal interpretation is constitutive of violent behavior as well as meaning, as long as
people are committed to using or resisting the social organizations of violence in making
their interpretations real, there will always be a tragic limit to the common meaning that
can be achieved." Id. at 1629; cf. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 Yale LJ. 1860, 1862 (1987) ("Interpretive activity appeals not to one overriding
authoritative community, but instead to people living in worlds of differences.").
73. In spite of these obstacles, Minow nonetheless encourages the use of rights
discourse. See Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 72, at 1909. Minow observes:
The use of rights discourse affirms community, but it affirms a particular
kind of community: a community dedicated to invigorating words with power to
restrain, so that even the powerless can appeal to those words. It is a community
that acknowledges and admits historic uses of power to exclude, deny, and
silence-and commits itself to enabling suppressed points of view to be heard, to
make covert conflict overt. Committed to making available a rhetoric of rights
where it has not been heard before, this community uses rights rhetoric to make
conflict audible and unavoidable, even if limited to words, or to certain forms of
words.
Id. at 1881 (footnotes omitted).
74. On objectification and omission in legal discourse, see Duncan, supra note 56, at
107 ("The more law is pushed in the direction of objectification, the more removed it
becomes from the reality of pain.").
75. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 Geo. LJ. 2567 (1993)
(examining lawyers' adoption of the role of moral and political prophet).
Norms of practice distance lawyers from the violence they impose upon clients in the
same way that the norms of sentencing distance judges from the violence they impose
upon defendants. In exploring the meaning of law's violence in the everyday work of
judges, Judge Wald discerns trends that "distance" judges from awareness of and
responsibility for court-ordered violence noteworthy in the sentencing process (p. 103).
Judge Wald asserts that the system of Federal Sentencing Guidelines "profoundly
distances the judge from the violent consequences of the sentence," thus "strip[ping] the
process of any personal dynamic between the deliverer and the recipient of that violence"
(p. 82). As a result, she opines, "The imposition of law's violence has been
depersonalized" (p. 83). Indeed, Judge Wald notes that during her five year tenure
(1986-1991) as Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, the Circuit accumulated a total affirmance rate of greater than 83%
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Patricia M. Wald, "...
Doctor, Lawyer,
Merchant, Chief," 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1127, 1142 n.33 (1992).
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"conditions of effective domination"76 are necessary to carry out their institutionally assigned role of legal rights interpreter. These conditions dictate
client dependency, marginality, subordination, and discipline. 77 Poor clients sometimes view the conditions of lawyer domination as an institutional manifestation of the impoverishing violence of the state. 78
For Cover, the authority and force of law's violence derives from the
state. Like Cover, Sarat and Kearns point out that "force is translated
routinely, though not without studied and careful organization, the marshaling of strong justifications, and recognizable roles and structures,
into pain, blood, and death" (p. 218). Moreover, like Cover, they observe
that the translation of force through word, deed, and institutional role
distorts sociolegal meaning (pp. 219-20). Unlike Cover, however, Sarat
and Kearns focus not on the "fact" that violence distorts meaning, but on
the "way violence distorts when compared to other distorting factors" (p.
220). By this comparison, they seek to elucidate "the way violence distorts
law and limits the possibilities and prospects of law itself" (p. 223). For
Sarat and Kearns, the hope that law transcends violence to attain a stance
"other-than-violence" is folly (p. 213). Violence reveals and purchases too
much of law.
For studies of the federal sentencing process in criminal cases, see Stanton Wheeler et
al., Sitting inJudgment: The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals (1988); Kenneth Mann
et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 479 (1980).
76. Cover, Violence and the Word, supra note 16, at 1616. While lawyers may bond to
their institutional roles and to the practices of client domination in word and deed, they
may experience a tension between the pull of formal institutional values and the moral
imperatives of individual dignity. Cover identified a similar moral-formal tension in the
context of antebellum adjudication. See Cover, Justice Accused, supra note 37, at
197-259; Michael S. Paulsen, AccusingJustice: Some Variations on the Themes of Robert
M. Cover'sJusticeAccused,7J.L. & Religion 33, 38 (1989) (locating moral-formal conflict at
the center ofJustice Accused).
Sarat and Kearns discern the acts of an apologist in Cover's effort "to identify the
conditions for the effective, but domesticated, organization and deployment of law's
violence" (p. 214). Indeed, they are not sanguine about identifying those conditions (p.
214). Neither are they optimistic about "a reconstruction of the premises of law's
relationship to society" (p. 215), for which such conditions are a prerequisite. Nor do they
"share" in the belief that "law could be homicidal without being Jurispathic' " (p. 215). In
sum, though they express admiration for Cover, Sarat and Kearns raise doubts concerning
his overall appreciation of "the difficulties of accommodating violence and law" (p. 215).
77. On the imposition of these conditions through practices of interpretive violence,
see Alfieri, supra note 15, at 2123-30; see also Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable
Acts, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 293, 302-03 (1993) (defining subordinating speech acts as acts
that confer "inferiority or loss of power, or [acts that] demean or denigrate").
78. Cover notes that "deeds of violence are rarely simply suffered by the victims
without conditions of domination, conditions that are themselves frequently, perhaps
always, tied to a history of violence which conditions the expectations of the actors."
Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 16, at 820; see also Austin
Sarat, "... The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the
Welfare Poor, 2 Yale J.L. & Human. 343, 352-53 (1990) (finding that welfare recipients
view legal services lawyers to be part of and to operate "inside" the bureaucratic apparatus
of the welfare state).
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Sarat and Kearns ascribe Cover's tolerance of law's violence to his
"ties" to philosophical liberalism. They uncover these ties in Cover's "use
of the polarities of freedom and order to describe the tensions of human
social life" (p. 223 n.55). In a deft move of deconstruction, they show
that this usage overlooks "[t] he internal coherence of systems of meaning
and the order already within freedom" (p. 227). In the same way, they
demonstrate that such usage neglects "the fragility of power and the possibilities of freedom already within the domain of order" (p. 227). These
omissions, Sarat and Kearns comment, combine to situate power and vio-9
lence "outside" the domain of meaning and interpretation (p. 228).7
Cover's approval of that disjunction transforms law's violence into an instrument of "peace" (p. 232).
Sarat and Kearns cite Cover's decreed transformation of natural violence into legitimate state force and, ultimately, into peace as an earmark
of the "liberal vision of law" (p. 233). They mention, for example,
Cover's parallel move "from power against freedom to rules against disorder" (p. 234). For Cover, this shift renders law's violence intelligible and
justifiable. And yet, Sarat and Kearns remain skeptical.8 0 They push
Cover to answer how law can commit homicidal acts of physical violence
without committing correspondingjurispathic acts of normative violence
(p. 241).81 Their testing of Cover's jurisprudence for evidence of reconciliation provides a kind of endgame. The conclusion itself is unambiguous: Cover's reconciliation of law's homicidal and jurispathic impulses
falls.
Law's violence, Sarat and Kearns argue, undermines normative values and hope (p. 242 n.129). Law and violence, they exclaim, "can never
adequately and satisfactorily be reconciled" (p. 242). Practical institutional forces-the roles, relations, and organization of violence-"undercut and oppose any self-limitation" on the jurispathic "impulse" (p. 242),
save meeting the requirement of a 'justificatory story" (p. 246).82
The justification of homicidal acts of violence, Sarat and Kearns explain, demands "strong" moral convictions or positivist reasons (p. 246 &
79. Sarat and Kearns assert that "hierarchies of power proliferate in all meaninggenerating activities" (p. 228).
80. Sarat and Kearns maintain that "Cover had neither such a romantic aversion to
violence, nor such an unqualified sympathy for freedom over order, that he rejected
violence entirely" (pp. 240-41 n.127).
81. Sarat has previously remarked on the "irresolvable contradictions" embedded in
the "paradigms of liberal legalism." Austin Sarat, Book Review, 94 Har'. L. Rev. 1911, 1924
(1981) (discussing the "ideas and ideals of access to justice").
82. For Sarat and Kearns, the jurispathic impulse of judges and legal agents prevails
because it is "ineliminably personal" (p. 245). Judgments are personal when "they bear the
marks of their author," and therefore "bespeak a perspective, a set of assumptions, a point
of view that is the decider's own and that cannot help but have an effect on the content of
the judgments made" (p. 245). For legal decision-makers, the consequence of personal
normative involvement in judging is the responsibility to decide thoughtfully, "to get it
right" (pp. 245-46). Fulfilling that responsibility requires a "justificatory story" (p. 246).
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n.145). 83 Those convictions both domesticate and transform law's violence in the sense that strong convictions establish a hierarchical relationship between the dominant legal order and subordinate normative communities. Hierarchy permits the legal order to "insist[ ] that what it
proclaims as right is the only acceptable version of right" (p. 247). Like
necessitarian logic, the jurispathic impulse triumphs because legal interpretation must "show not only that its decisions are technically sustainable, but that they merit imposition against those who might resist, that they
are worthy of being lived in and through the pain that is done in their
name" (p. 247).
Field's case illustrates the necessitarian transformation of interpretive acts intojurispathic deeds of excess violence. The interpretive acts at
issue concern my reading of disability law, particularly the meaning of
literacy. Jurispathic deeds refer to the conduct of my direct and redirect
examinations in erasing Field's dignity, silencing her narratives of functional literacy, and suppressing her history of suffering racial inequality
and segregation in education. Typically, as here, such deeds are manifested in speech acts. Law and legal institutions assign well-defined
speech acts to lawyers, clients, and decision-makers. For lawyers and clients, the allocation of such institutionally-designated acts follows the
precepts of consent theory. Consistent with standard consent procedure,8 4 a client delegates her power as an original speaker to a lawyer
who, in turn, assumes the authority to intervene on her behalf. Too
often, the necessitarian logic of intervention leads to excess violence.
III. ExcEss
Excess normative violence occurs when lawyers displace clients as
original, nonsubstitutable speakers. This displacement collapses the distinction between descriptive and performative speech acts. Once lawyers
declare nonsubstitutable performative speech acts, their sentences misfire, overstating or understating the character of the material world. Accurate performative speech acts involve client declared narratives that are
exactly repeatable by lawyers, resistant to dismantlement by decision-makers, and enriched by the inlaying of community voices.
Field's adopted role of a disability claimant designates her as an original speaker. This designation conveys the authority to speak, but it does
not establish the existence of her illiteracy. This condition is not given; it
must be brought into existence. Bringing the history of Field's illiteracy
into existence requires a speech act-a narrative-that only Field can
83. On the character of legal and moral justice, see Thomas R. Kearns, Socratic
Jurisprudence: The Province of Legal Morality-Undetermined, 91 Yale L.J. 1508, 1518
(1982) (book review).

84. On the materiality and mystifications of consent and consensual relations in the
contexts of medicine and political philosophy, see Elaine Scarry, Consent and the Body.
Injury, Departure, and Desire, 21 New Literary Hist. 867 (1990).
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perform. Silencing or suppressing Field's performative act inflicts excess
violence.
In her essay, "The Declaration of War: Constitutional and Unconstitutional Violence," Elaine Scarry invokes the Austinian distinction be-

tween descriptive and performative speech acts. 85 Scarry argues that de-

scriptive speech constrains the spoken word (p. 76). It registers events
"already" in existence (p. 55). In a descriptive speech act, what is spoken
is crucial (p. 76). The sentence, rather than the speaker, is the locus of
representation. Because the content of the descriptive sentence is determinative, the speaker is substitutable (p. 42). Performative speech, by
comparison, constrains the speaker. It "originates" events in the world
(p. 76). In a performative speech act, who is speaking is critical (p. 76).
The speaker is the locus of representation. Yet, because the speaker of
the performative sentence is determinative, she is nonsubstitutable (p.
42).
The nonsubstitutability of the speaker in performative sentences derives from the power of performative speech to actualize material acts (p.
48). A performative sentence summons real acts and consequences into
existence.8 6 It "creates a material replication of its own already existing
verbal action" (p. 61). In a sense, "[i]t predicts the reality that it then
brings into being" (p. 61).
Scarry suggests that performative and descriptive speakers bear responsibility for their speech acts (p. 56). The nature of that responsibility, she contends, differs in accordance with the substance of the act-the
type of sentence-and its relation to the material world (pp. 42-43).a17 A
descriptive sentence, for example, "'represents' or aspires to represent,
the world as given" (p. 43). The material world "exercises referential control over the content of the sentence" (p. 48). A performative sentence, in
contrast, "bypasses (hence, derealizes or annihilates) the material reality
as given in order to bring new sets of arrangements into being" (p. 43).
The material world exerts referential control over the speaker of the sentence (p. 43).
Scarry makes two findings concerning the relation of descriptive and
performative acts to the material word.8 8 She alleges that many descriptive sentences fail to represent the world "accurately" (p. 76). Further,
she avers that many performative sentences are spoken by the "wrong
85. See generallyJohn L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (1962).
86. See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness
in Police Interrogation, 103 Yale L.J. 259, 265 (1993) ("Performative utterances are speech
acts that, by being uttered, accomplish the state of affairs to which they refer .
").
87. For a more sustained investigation of the relation between language and the
material world, see Elaine Scarry, Introduction to Literature and the Body: Essays on
Populations and Persons, at vii (Elaine Scarry ed. , 1988) [hereinafter Literature and the
Body).
88. On the materiality and materialization of social practices, see Elaine Scarry, War
and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1257, 1287-1316 (1991).
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speaker" (p. 76). Scarry seeks to encourage accurate descriptive
sentences and rightly spoken performative sentences (p. 76).
Descriptive sentences commit errors of inaccuracy through acts of
overstatement and understatement. Overstatement occurs when the sentence sweeps over descriptive features of the world. Understatement
arises when the sentence omits descriptive features. In Field's case, I
committed both errors of speech. In my direct and redirect examinations, I overstated Field's illiteracy, denying the dignity and silencing the
narratives of her functional literacy. At the same time, I omitted and
therefore understated her history as a woman of color struggling in an
educational context of racial inequality and segregation.
Overstatement and understatement result from a lawyer's attempt to
usurp a client's position as "authentic speaker" (p. 32).89 Lawyer usurpation distorts the material world. My description of Field's illiteracy, for
example, denigrated her functional skills and obliterated the inequality
and racism infecting her education. Usurpation also bars new sociolegal
arrangements from coming into being. This bar rises from the "enunciation of the performative act by the wrong speaker" (p. 28). Thus enunciated, the sentence" 'misfires'" (p. 29). By misfires, Scarry means that the
performative act in fact "never takes place and, hence, neither do its effects" (p. 29). Because I am the wrong speaker to bring Field's illiteracy
into existence, my declaration of her illiteracy at the ALJ hearing misfired. Misfiring condemned Field's narratives of racial inequality and segregation to silence. Indeed, they were never heard.
To render descriptive sentences accurate and performative sentences
valid, Scarry considers alternative methods of legitimating speech acts:
delegability and transmissibility (pp. 32-33). A speech act is delegable if
the speaker originally obligated to carry out the act chooses a substitute
speaker and transfers the obligation to perform it (p. 32). A speech act is
transmissible if the original speaker performs, rather than transfers, the
act and that performance enacts material consequences (p. 32). The performance of the speech act by the original speaker grants transmissible
authority insofar as that performance "permits and creates the conditions
under which many other actions can take place" (p. 32). In this manner,
the performance of the original act "radiate[s] outward in its consequence[s]," enabling other speakers to perform "parallel, duplicate, or
derivative" acts (p. 32). The accumulation of speech acts results in a
"wider materialization" of the performative sentence (p. 32).
Scarry argues that the performative materialization of a declarative
sentence evolves through the accrual of adjunctive features of materiality:
89. The distinction between authentic and inauthentic speakers, like the distinction
between descriptive and performative speech acts, is unstable and thus subject to contest.
In certain instances, for example when a victim of police brutality dies in custody, lawyers
may make a strong claim to the position of authentic speaker. In these circumstances,
lawyers' descriptive speech acts may produce the material consequences of performative
acts.
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exact repeatability, the inlaying of voices, and dismantlement (pp.
43-44). The first two features combine to "thicken" the material content
of a sentence (pp. 43-44, 47-49). The exact repeatability of a sentence
and the "coinhabitation of multiple voices" (p. 45) pronouncing that sentence, Scarry contends, "thicken[] and give[ ] substance to the verbal
performative" (p. 44). Field's declaration of functional competence, for
example, is exactly repeatable by the multiple voices of lawyers, witnesses,
and decision-makers. Repeatability thickens the materiality of the sentence, thus helping Field to bring her functional literacy into existence.
The inlaying of voices (pp. 44, 63-64) furnishes material weight to
the performative sentence in a more "overt" fashion (pp. 54-55). 9 0
Often the inlaying of voices occurs in "highly formal" acts of testimony
expressing the "cumulative weight" of a community (p. 47), such as the
testimony of Field's family and friends. The site of the inlaying may be
located inside the hearing room in testimony or outside on the street in
words of protest. Whatever the site, the inlaying establishes a "correspondence" (p. 63) between a verbal utterance and material reality. This material correspondence, in turn, "stabilizes and constrains" the performative
speech act (p. 63).
The third adjunctive feature-dismantlement-works both to "thin
out" (pp. 43-44, 47-49) and to thicken a declarative sentence. The sentence is thinned out by decoupling and reattaching its component parts.
It is thickened by challenging its baseline assumptions and by garnering
stronger arguments (p. 55). Consider the following sentence: Field is literate. Decoupling formal and functional notions of literacy thins out the
sentence to read: Field isfunctionally literate. Challenging the institutional
assumption that functional literacy implies the ability to perform "other
work" in the national economy thickens the sentence to read: Field'sfunctional literacy is insufficient to render her able to perform "other work" in the national economy; therefore, she is disabled.
Field's self-abasing testimony of illiteracy on direct and redirect examination represents an unsatisfactory performative speech act. To be
accurate and valid, this performative act must enable Field to express
both a dignitary narrative of functional literacy and a historical narrative
of racial inequality and segregation. Only Field's performative speech,
repeated by her lawyers, dismantled by decision-makers, and thickened by
the inlaying of the testimony of her family and friends, can enact a material reality accurately reflecting those narratives. That enactment, accompanied by the voices of Field's community, engenders opposition to excess violence. 9 1
90. For earlier mention of the notion of inlaying, see Elaine Scarry, Donne: "But Yet
the Body Is His Booke," in Literature and the Body, supra note 87, at 70, 96.
91. Scarry observes: "The fact of acknowledging a people's existence is... only a halfstep away from acknowledging its capacity to resist" (p. 64).
On the subject of resistance in Cover's writings, see Robert M. Cover, Bringing the
Messiah Through the Law. A Case Study, in Religion, Morality, and the Law 201, 203 (J.
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OPPOSITON

Opposition constitutes an alternative strategy of curbing lawyers' necessitarian logic. This strategy forms at the intersection of normative and
narrative violence, the point where violence is inscribed in the text of
narrative. Necessitarian reasoning suggests that some violence is unspeakable. In fact, some violence is unspeakable not because it adheres
to the logic of necessity, but because it exceeds the text of narrative. The
strategy of opposition tests the limits of the speakable in advocacy, requiring lawyers to disrupt and to negotiate the given limits of texts by reopening the meaning-making practices of reading and speaking, and equally
important, by recentering client identity, narrative, and history in the discourses of law and legal institutions.
In her essay, "Reading Violence," Carol Greenhouse attempts this reopening and recentering by asserting the intersectionality of physical and
narrative violence. 92 Greenhouse asserts that narratives represent oral
texts in which experiences of violence are "temporarily inscribed and
reappraised" (p. 120).93 In this respect, violence is embedded or incorporated into the sociocultural text of narratives (p. 120). As such, "vioRoland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1988) (contending that Messianic and
apocalyptic narratives resist and challenge the authority of social controls); Robert M.
Cover, The Folktales ofJustice: Tales ofJurisdiction, 14 Cap. U. L. Rev. 179, 190 (1985)
(noting the importance of the "gesture and aspiration of resistance" in myth and history);
Robert M. Cover, Atrocious Judges: Lives of Judges Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and
Instruments of Oppression, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1003, 1005 (1968) (book review) (praising
the turn to draft resistance by young men opposed to the Vietnam War); see also Paulsen,
supra note 76, at 92 (reiterating Cover's concerns regarding the timing and form of
resistance).
92. Greenhouse borrows her methods from legal anthropology and from the writings
of Robert Cover. The tie binding these two bodies of sociolegal research is the distinction
between force and words (pp. 105-06). She argues that this distinction informs the
language, methods, and traditions of sociolegal research (p. 106). The result is a field
divided roughly along an interpretivist-empirical axis, an 'axis dividing symbolic,
hermeneutic, and interpretivist approaches on the one hand from empirical studies of
social action (politics, economy, courts, and so on) on the other" (p. 108). Greenhouse's
espoused purpose "is to strengthen the intellectual bridge across that divide" (p. 107).
Greenhouse argues that interpretivists and empiricists jointly underestimate law's role
"in the circulation of violence in social systems" (p. 110) and understate the linguistic
presence of "coercion, power, and violence" in the composition of texts (p. 110). She
defines interpretivists in terms of their primary approach to the law "as text" (p. 110).
Citing the "proximity of textual and physical forms of violence" (p. 111 n.13), she
challenges the settled distinction between "a real-world domain of power and violence and
an 'imaginary' world of symbols that 'operates' apart from it" (p. 110). For Greenhouse,
violence is both physical and textual. See also Reginald L. Robinson, "The Other Against
Itself': Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 15, 24 (1993) (describing the physical violence between African and Korean
Americans as "a form of talk-a means of communicating").
93. Greenhouse employs ethnographic case studies to establish the intersectionality of
physical and interpretive violence. The first of these studies examines the historical
narratives of the Ilongot, an indigenous people located in the uplands of Northern Luzon,
the Philippines (p. 112). The Ilongot narratives, Greenhouse contends, demonstrate the
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lence is not outside the symbolic language of the community, but is central to it, as the theme, medium, and syntax of their narrative texts" (p.
121). These texts "are in part legible because of the way they 'speak' the
violence of the everyday..." (pp. 120-21). Textual violence merely "extends, circulates, modifies, or contains" the physical violence found in the
world (p. 121).
Greenhouse claims that the "textuality of violence" contains limits
(p. 122). Those "textual limits are not fixed, but change with culture,
consciousness, and context" (p. 122). At times, "some violence surpasses-or falls awry of-the text" (p. 122). Greenhouse remarks that
"texts do not contain or express all of the violence that people are capable of unleashing on each other" (p. 123). Violence may be "excessive," a
violence "out of proportion," a violence of the "extreme" (pp. 120-21).
For Greenhouse, as for Field, excess violence is experienced as narrative
disruption, even though violence is itself "not uniformly disruptive" (p.
120).
To the extent that violence is "encoded" in the narratives of everyday
life and the texts of the social order, Greenhouse argues, interpretation
in no way precludes "contact" with violence (p. 122). Interpretation in
fact explodes the distinction between "real" and "symbolic" violence (p.
120). The site of both violence and opposition is the text. On this definition, "textual interpretation is itself a practice that absorbs and generates
a certain amount of violence, as it probes the textual limits of the speaka"double proximity of violence and narrative on the one hand, and, close by, the social
landscape and the physical landscape on the other" (p. 116).
The second study considers the narrative episodes of the Raluli, an indigenous people
located in Papua New Guinea (p. 116). The Kaluli narratives narrow the proximity of
physical and textual violence, integrating violence into the very syntax of narrative.
The third study traces the arguments presented to the United States Supreme Court
in a recent death penalty case, Perry v. Louisiana, 494 U.S. 1015 (1990). Greenhouse reads
the arguments as a series of contests juxtaposing violence and order, killing and healing,
murder and execution (p. 131). Central to these tensions are issues of time, place, and
self-representation (p. 132).
Perry's lawyers, Greenhouse explains, advance a notion of personhood couched in a
temporal framework. Put simply, they argue that "forced medical 'treatment' will hasten
his execution..." (p. 132). This self-representation or biography is time-bound. The State
of Louisiana, Greenhouse notes, offers a contrasting self-representation that is timeless in
quality. The State argues: "Perry is ill and must be treated; he is a criminal and must be
punished" (p. 132).
Greenhouse counterposes the text of the arguments in Perry to demonstrate not only
their "temporal incongruity" (p. 133), but also their "mutually exclusive meanings" (p.
133). The geographic and hierarchical setting of the arguments compounds those
contradictions. Greenhouse points out that Perry establishes a "hierarchy of readers"
shared between "two places": the Supreme Court and Louisiana (p. 134). It is this
hierarchy, Greenhouse submits, that permits the "textual containment of radically
different-even contradictory-logics and goals..." (p. 134).
Greenhouse also suggests the intersectionality of physical and interpretive violence in
her account of community narratives of local Civil War battles. See Carol J. Greenhouse,
Praying for Justice: Faith, Order, and Community in an American Town 61-69 (1986)
[hereinafter Greenhouse, Praying forJustice].
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ble" (p. 135). Greenhouse asserts that "an essential task of textual interpretation is to discover the contours of the text against the unspeakable
that it claims to keep at bay" (p. 123). These limits, according to
Greenhouse, are "never fixed, but are negotiated within the text . . .
through successive readings" (p. 135). 94 The negotiation of textual violence determines the boundaries of necessity, excess, and opposition.
Field's direct and redirect examinations demonstrate the inscription
of normative violence into a textual form. Moreover, the examinations
show the normative, and sometimes linguistic, contradictions of textual
negotiation among lawyers, clients, and decision-makers. Greenhouse
challenges the power of legal institutions to "control or deny" (p. 137)
those difference-based contradictions. She locates that challenge in everyday "habits of reading" (p. 138).
To Greenhouse, reading is a form of "critical engagement" (p. 139)
capable of "discovering" and "transgressing" institutional strategies of
meaning-making (p. 137). The practical and ethical task is "constantly"
to reopen the question of how we "frame meanings from among the possibilities that language, common sense, and [our] personal expertise
make available" (p. 137). The reopening of lawyers' epistemological, interpretive, and linguistic practices stands as an act of opposition.
Reopening lawyers' meaning-making practices is the first move toward opposing law- or lawyer-inflicted normative violence. Encouraging
client resistance to such violence is the second move. 95 In Field's case,
lawyer violence deals in the pain of humiliation, the silencing of narra94. Greenhouse adverts to such negotiation when she observes: "although there were
several historical vocabularies in Hopewell, there was more or less one canonical version of
the past." Carol J. Greenhouse, Revisiting Hopewell: A Reply to Neal Milner, 17 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 335, 339 (1992). That version represents a set of community "selfaffirmations." See CarolJ. Greenhouse, Signs of Quality: Individualism and Hierarchy in
American Culture, 19 Am. Ethnologist 233, 236 (1992).
On the construction of community, see Greenhouse, Praying for Justice, supra note
93, at 107 (classifying the local concept of the "community of Christ" in three time frames:
"past (the historical community), present (the living congregation), and future (the
community rejoined in heaven)"); see also Carol J. Greenhouse, Book Review, 8 Law &
Hist. Rev. 144, 146 (1990) (reviewing Sally F. Moore, Social Facts and Fabrication:
"Customary" Law on Kilimanjaro, 1880-1980 (1986)) (noting that "anthropological
definitions of 'law' have broadened to encompass the normative dimensions of a general
way of life").
95. Jody Freeman asserts that "recognizing signs of resistance does not erase the
effects of objectifying and reductive representations." Jody Freeman, The Disciplinary
Function of Rape's Representation: Lessons from the Kennedy Smith and Tyson Trials, 18
Law & Soc. Inquiry 517, 543 (1993) (reviewing Rape and Representation (Lynn A. Higgins
& Brenda R. Silver eds., 1991)). Freeman states:
[T]he form and substance of the resistance may itself be influenced and
constrained by the dominant discourses of race or gender. Resistance can appear
in many forms and be partial; it does not necessarily require a wholesale rejection
of all stereotypes or scripts. It may amount merely to the suggestion that other
identities are possible, without displacing existing ones.
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tive, and the suppression of racial inequality and segregation. The text of
my direct and redirect examinations shows Field already resisting humiliation by trying to negotiate the meaning of illiteracy in the alternative
terms of functional competence. 9 6 Field's reluctance to admit publicly
her own inability to read signifies opposition to juridical inscriptions of
violence in her own life.
Field's testimony and the unheard narratives of her family and
friends confront the text of law's and lawyers' violence with a different
text embedded with different meanings. 97 Those differences hold the
jurisgenerative potential for opposition. It is the lawyer's ethical responsibility to help make those differences speakable. That responsibility extends to counseling clients regarding the potential costs and benefits of
speaking out.
Unlike judges, lawyers lack the heroic power to declare redemptive
narratives. 98 Instead, their narratives are descriptive; their powers are interventionist. The task in poverty law advocacy, as in all moral-political
dilemmas entangling the anxiety of law and lawyering, is to decide when
to "intervene" and describe client narratives, and when to stand apart and
permit the client to perform her own narratives.9 9 No universal rule is
available to guide this decision-making, 10 0 though some will urge pragmatic or utopian solutions. 10 Others will advise restraint,10 2 offer tech96. Michael Ryan explains the multiplicity of meanings available in the sociolegal
world. See Michael Ryan, Meaning and Alternity, in Narrative, Violence, and the Law,
supra note 24, at 267. He states:
Meanings and interpretations emerge from a multiplicity of sites. And those sites
are themselves temporary stabilizations of dynamic situations, of intersecting lines
of determination that are social, psychological, economic, sexual, and so on.
Each singular meaning conceals a multiplicity, and there is a multiplicity of
meaning as much because there is a multiplicity of social locations as because
there is a multiplicity of semantic possibilities.
Id. at 274.
97. For Greenhouse, interpretive meaning and understanding flow out of difference,
not solidarity (p. 134). Interpretation requires not "a solidary community of readers" but
information and discipline (p. 134). Difference enables interpretive communities to
contest allegedly common meanings and convergent understandings.
98. Weisberg encourages rejection of the image of the "heroic judge." See Robert
Weisberg, The Calabresianjudicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 213, 256 (1983) (discussing images of judging in common-law and statutory
adjudication).
99. See Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 Yale LJ. 1916, 1957
(1987) (examining the moral-formal dilemmas posed in Cover's work).
100. Cf. Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society
Research, 21 Law & Soc'y Rev. 165, 170 (1987) (admonishing law and society scholars
against turning "bounded" sociolegal observations into "universals").
101. On the prevalence of pragmatic and utopian reasoning, see Robert M. Cover &
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale LJ.
1035, 1050 (1977) (cataloguing the divergent positions of "utopian" and "pragmatic"
constitutional approaches in habeas corpus jurisprudence).
102. See Dennis E. Curtis &Judith Resnik, Images ofJustice, 96 Yale LJ. 1727, 1755
(1987) (addressing volitional acts of restraint).
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nique,10 3 or appeal to discretion.' 0 4
Neither technique nor discretion, however, will eradicate interpretive violence. Lawyers' interventionist reflexes are too strong. 10 5 To the
extent that participation in the interpretive process of law and lawyering
is unavoidable, violence is inevitable. Opposing violence through meaning-making practices of reading and speaking involves restoring client
normative values to lawyer descriptive and client performative narratives
in advocacy. In Field's case, the normative values of dignity, competence,
and race have been severed from both lawyer and client narratives. The
material referents of Field's life-the dignity of functional literacy and
the violence of racial inequality and segregation-are invisible. My direct
and redirect examinations did not and cannot invoke the normative or
material content of her world.
06
It is not simply that we-lawyers-are ignorant of Field's world.
Our language lacks the "material possibilities," 10 7 the capacity to give
voice and to reenact the historical text of her world. Our law discounts
this historical text as irrelevant and therefore inadmissable. Lacking the
capacity for and the possibility of sustained opposition to interpretive violence, for now we must hope that " [t]he substantiveness of language-its
capacity to mime, and perhaps eventually acquire, the actual weight of
what it describes" 10 8 will lead us away from violence to other worlds. The
goal is to reposition our language and ourselves to speak to and work with
others without violence.
CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have attempted to reopen Cover's jurisprudence of
violence by identifying lawyers as jurispathic agents of violence and by
103. But see Robert M. Cover, Dispute Resolution: A Foreword, 88 Yale LJ. 910, 914
(1979) (expressing skepticism toward reform that "proposes a remedy to substantial
indecency or injustice via technique").
104. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083,
1083 (1988) (approving a professional duty of reflective and discretionary judgment in
assisting clients to pursue actions that promote justice).
105. On the interventionist reflex in materialist practice, see Elaine Scarry, Literature
and the Body, supra note 87, at xxiii ("Because materialist practice assumes language acts
on the real world and because it continually credits the possibility that literature acts on
historical reality, it also gives rise to a genre of criticism which itself acts to alter (rather
than merely describe) the literary text."). Scarry's materialist conception of language rests
on two assumptions: "first, that language is capable of registering in its own contours the
contours and weight of the material world; second, that language itself may enter, act on,
and alter the material world." Id. at xi.
106. Hay cites the ignorance of politics and history as a causal link in establishing the
legitimacy of powers outside law (i.e., the offense of "scandalizing the court"). See Douglas
Hay, Contempt by Scandalizing the Court: A Political History of the First Hundred Years,
25 Osgoode Hall LJ.431, 483 (1987).
107. See Elaine Scarry, Donne: "ButYet the Body Is His Booke," in Literature and the
Body, supra note 87, at 70, 74.
108. Id. at 70, 81.
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defining lawyers' interpretive practices as pain-imposing forms of normative violence. Reopening is spurred by my reading of Sarat and Kearns's
Law's Violence. In conjunction with that text, I have tried to formulate an
alternative vocabulary that describes, explains, and justifies the intersection of law, lawyers, legal institutions, and violence. I undertake these
efforts because violence is frequently submerged in the daily motions of
law, legal institutions, and lawyers. A similar motive inspires the insights
of Law's Violence. Yet in the end, what recommends Law's Violence is not
merely the elegance of its insights, but its ability to confront the institutional necessity and the cruel excess of violence in law and nevertheless to
glimpse the possibility of opposition, and with it, the hope of
reconstruction.

